Thanks for putting this proposal together. It’s good to see new tools being tested around governance and decision-making. That energy matters for Velora’s growth and token visibility, and we appreciate approach outlined here by @SEEDGov and collaborators.
That said, we have a few questions and concerns:
Representation of smaller holders. It’s not clear how futarchy improves representation for small token holders. If participation effectively depends on paying to play, it risks reinforcing whale influence rather than broadening it.
Price ≠ governance quality. Several delegates already flagged that not every proposal maps cleanly to token price. Using price as the sole signal feels fragile as a governance input, even if it’s easy to measure. We’d like to see a path to incorporate additional metrics (revenue, volume, user activity) if this continues, echoing comments from @Sov and @PGov.
Limited track record. Outside of a couple of experiments (e.g., Gnosis/Kleros), we don’t yet have robust evidence this improves decisions in practice. Even supporters in the thread frame this as experimental, which we agree with.
Participation scale and quality. The target of 20–40 traders per market seems low for something that aims to inform governance. We agree with @Benibauer3 and @Sov that success criteria should be explicit upfront (participation, volume, signal divergence, and how signals influence delegate rationales). If this proceeds, it should be paired with education, co-marketing, and clear reporting so the community can actually learn from it.
On incentives (CP points). We’re not supportive of the idea of distributing CP points for futarchy participation at this early pilot stage. If futarchy were to be implemented as an “official” governance mechanism at a later stage, this point should be discussed from the pov of the delegate program itself, not within this proposal.
On the “price is long-term” argument. We appreciate @kas and @0xAlex laying out why price can, in theory, embed long-term expectations, and the examples from Kleros. Our worry is practical: thin participation plus narrative-driven flows can overwhelm fundamentals, especially in short windows. Price may be a signal, but not the only one we should rely on.
That said, the experiment is interesting and the pilot comes with limited risk, so if we see there is widespread support among delegates then we will not block the proposal but abstain.
If the DAO proceeds and later considers extending beyond the initial 6 months, we may request a more detailed and adapted proposal. Including:
- Success criteria defined upfront, in line with requests from @Sov and @Benibauer3 (min/target/stretch for unique traders and volumes, explicit thresholds for YES/NO divergence, and a requirement that at least one delegate rationale references the market outcome for it to “count” as useful).
- Metrics beyond price explored in future markets (e.g., revenue, fees, active users) as suggested by multiple delegates, so we’re not optimizing purely for “number go up.”
- Participation quality guards: sybil resistance for “unique traders,” disclosure on liquidity concentration/rebalances, and a ban on outcome-directional incentives. If any participation rewards are tested, they must be neutral, capped, and paired with sybil controls, per @jengajojo_daoplomats’ concern.
- A transparent post-mortem template each round (participation, depth, divergence, market resolution, any manipulation attempts, and how signals were used in delegate rationales), aligning with @PGov and others calling for institutional learning.