PIP-62 - Velora Governance Task Force

Governance Proposals
1

PIP-62 - Velora Governance Task Force

Abstract

Given the current stage of the DAO, which is experiencing a process of revitalized activity and the incorporation of professional contributors across various areas, we observe the need for a governance participant who is neither a core developer nor an incentivized delegate, to guide the DAO in the long-term and ensure that incentives remain aligned. And we want to contribute to this effort.

This proposal aims to transition our role and responsibilities in the DAO from our current role as delegates and DIP Program Managers to a more comprehensive and integral role with more scopes and responsibilities that will allow us to be more deeply committed and involved in the governance of the DAO.

During the proposed period, we will take on a variety of tasks and responsibilities aimed at improving the DAO’s decision-making processes, increasing both the quantity and quality of activity, strengthening Velora DAO, and adequately preparing the DAO to face the imminent challenge of implementing Project Miró.

Goals & Review

1.- Introduction - Motivation and Rationale:

One of our first actions upon formally joining the DAO at the beginning of the last quarter of 2024 was to conduct an in-depth research and analysis of the challenges facing both the Protocol and the DAO. Based on our findings, we produced a comprehensive report that not only outlined the current situation but also identified key actions needed to address these challenges and to reverse the situation. Our goal was to help steer the DAO toward becoming a pivotal force in the success of the Protocol.

As delegates we tried to address some of them, proposed and implemented some of the ideas outlined therein that have achieved the intended positive impact and have helped to begin to reverse the state of the DAO that we have shared with the community. However, after taking these important steps over the past six months, we recognize the limitations of what we can achieve within our current role as delegates, but to deepen the changes we have been proposing in the DAO requires taking on a role that involves greater coordination and management faculties, as well as increased responsibilities. Expanding our scope would allow us to more effectively implement the structural improvements we have been advocating for and ensure their long-term impact. We remain committed to the vision and objectives outlined in the report, and based on that, there are several key areas we would like to address and further develop.

Our goal is to enhance the DAO’s structure, resilience, and decision-making processes, ultimately building a stronger, more resilient, and economically sustainable DAO that serves as a driver for the protocol’s growth. The DAO is embarking on the ambitious process of implementing Project Miró, which will bring numerous changes and improvements to the protocol.

At the current stage of Velora DAO ongoing governance revamp, there’s an expressed need to keep escalating operations and frameworks -when needed- to remain aligned with a DAO’s long-term vision, rather than being swayed by short-term shifts in participation. We are proposing to transcend being ‘delegates’ and establish a formal role that allows us to serve as an objective and impartial third party to the greatest extent possible.

The definition of a mission and vision and keeping an internal consistency requires extra efforts that demand some operational roles to evolve and to increase their scopes of work. The formalisation of a DAO ‘Facilitator/Governance Task Force’ role becomes a clear need to pursue a long-term perspective tied to increase predictability and set expectations between the different stakeholders from a neutral point of view.

The one-year proposed agreement will give the team the chance to continue to implement, experiment, test, adjust and streamline the governance processes alongside the DAO’s growth and changing needs. The length of this ‘mandate’ will also help accumulate knowledge, including an understanding of historical decisions, past challenges, and the rationale behind key governance structures, allowing for the anticipation and mitigation of potential inefficiencies while paving the way for future teams or individuals to step into the ‘Governance Facilitator’ role.

We believe this is the right time to take this step and contribute greater value and impact to both the DAO and the protocol.

Some specific aspects that we would like to address from now on:

  • Formally assign the role and tasks of a Governance Facilitator. Currently, these role/responsibilities are being informally managed by the Laita Labs with our support from SEED in certain areas, such as monitoring delegate activity and coordinating efforts with key stakeholders we have introduced to the DAO.
  • Facilitate and coordinate the discussions and efforts among stakeholders to define a strategic vision and mission for the DAO, considering its direction and objectives.
  • Oversee and coordinate the alignment and prioritization of the strategic proposals needed for the DAO to drive the protocol’s growth and coordinate efforts accordingly.
  • Keep optimal coordination and improve synergies between the DAO actors, including Laita, the Foundation, Service Providers, and partners.
  • Participate in the development and design of the workflows and framework development that the DAO requires for service providers and grants, just to name an example.
  • Facilitate and guide the process of establishing a dedicated treasury management structure with a defined framework to professionalize the DAO`s financial oversight.

2.- ParaSwap/Velora <> SEEDGov:

Since we joined ParaSwap’s governance, we have taken several steps in a short period to address some of the issues outlined in our above-mentioned post. In this regard, and in some cases in coordination with the ParaSwap Foundation, we proposed significant changes that were supported by the DAO—changes that, given the DAO’s stage and level of activity at the time, carried certain risks. These included taking the initial steps to establish a delegate program to attract new participants and talent to the DAO, as well as reforming the proposal lifecycle framework.

These changes were structural and carried inherent risks, requiring us to carefully assess their impact. For this reason, we did not find it logical to receive compensation for roles such as DIP Program Manager or as delegates. If these initiatives had failed, the DAO would have rightly questioned paying for something that yielded negative results or had no meaningful impact.

The DAO’s approval of our initiatives was already a great vote of confidence, for which we are deeply grateful.

Since becoming part of ParaSwapDAO, we have made calculated decisions, choices that, fortunately, have resulted in the positive outcomes we envisioned when we first proposed them.

This is a brief summary of the positive impact of some of our initiatives:

  • Governance Improvements: A more structured proposal lifecycle that provides greater transparency and strengthens the decision-making process, helping to avoid the negative consequences of malicious or harmful PIPs, whether due to error or bad faith.
  • ParaSwap Growth Working Group (PGWG): We promoted the creation, organization, and selection of members for this temporary structure, which will take the first steps in identifying needs, formalizing a structured action plan within a defined framework, and enabling the DAO to contribute to ParaSwap’s growth. The PGWG was fully integrated in mid-February and is currently actively working.
  • Delegates Program & Engagement:
    • The first Delegate Trial Program launched in December 2024 resulted in 12 active delegates participating in ParaSwap governance, many of whom have recognized experience and track records in numerous DAOs. Additionally, it provided an opportunity for members of the ParaSwapDAO community to apply as delegates, finding in this program a suitable platform to contribute more actively and add value. Today, a little over 3 months since the launch of the first program, there are 15 active participating delegates.
    • New members have joined, and former members who were evidently eager to participate but couldn’t find the right space have returned to activity, which they have fortunately now found.
    • This has increased the resilience and strength of the DAO, helping deter governance takeover. The VP has been better distributed among more actors, reversing the previous high concentration.
    • For a more in-depth analysis of this topic, please read our report on the subject.
    • Given the success of this trial program, we have promoted the launch of the first cycle of the ParaSwap Delegate Incentives Program that started in March to take a step forward and deepen this path.
  • Community Calls / AMAs: We organized and hosted 3 highly attended Community Calls / AMAs where important topics were opened for debate. The community was very receptive to this proposal, the number of participants gradually increased, as did the diversity of participants representing different interests - delegates, stakers, investors, users, members of Laita and the Foundation, etc. - which led to an increase in the quality and breadth of the debate in each call. This confirms our initial impression that there is an active and eager community within ParaSwap wanting to learn more about the current status of the protocol and its DAO. We aim to deepen and standardize this approach.

In summary, when we joined the DAO the overall activity was almost non-existent, but with our intervention the DAO was able to make rapid progress in generating activity, debate, engaging talent, generating the first key structures and strengthening processes.

In the last few months, and especially with the recent events related to Bybit’s request to ParaSwapDAO for the return of 44.67 wETH, it has become clear to us that this increased activity in the DAO and the engagement of professional delegates is essential for the health and strength of the DAO, as more participation, more voices, more visions and more debate strengthens the DAO itself and the decisions that are taken in general and in this very relevant case in particular.

3.- New role - Scope - What we offer:

We have more ideas to implement and now feel more confident in the DAO and its community, which has been receptive to the initial direction we proposed. With Project MirĂł entering its early implementation phase, the protocol is set for significant changes and improvements. These will also bring major challenges, requiring the DAO to be better prepared and more organized.

To support this evolution, we propose redefining our role to provide a structured service to the DAO, deepening our commitment and responsibilities. Our goal remains the same: to strengthen the DAO, enhance its activity, and help it become a driving force behind the protocol’s growth. We believe the DAO has immense potential and want to contribute by coordinating efforts to accelerate its transformation.

Our Planned Actions:

  • Commit to propose governance actions to help define Velora DAO’s priorities within operations, and community engagement. Our focus will be on fostering better decision-making, strengthening DAO structure, raising the quantity/quality of debate, attracting talent, increasing partnerships, and identify areas where the DAO can actively collaborate to support and drive the protocol’s growth.
  • Act as a liaison and coordinate efforts with the Foundation, Laita Labs, service providers, partners, working groups, committees, task forces and any other future roles or stakeholders. This includes focusing on community engagement, understanding user needs and aligning the DAOs perspective on strategic proposals. The goal is to translate these efforts into actionable plans while also ensuring their effective execution.
  • Support and promote the creation of task forces, committees, and/or working groups with well-defined scopes and structured frameworks, ensuring their coordination with other DAO structures as DAO deems necessary to fulfill its purpose. Strengthening these initiatives will help establish more predictable and robust structures, fostering effective collaboration among stakeholders to drive the growth of both the DAO and the protocol.
  • Continue improving governance processes by evaluating and updating governance parameters and decision-making mechanisms to enhance the DAO’s security, refining and improving the PIP lifecycle, implementing on-chain voting, and revisiting quorum and PSP thresholds, integrating more automated tools to track delegate participation metrics accurately, among others initiatives.
  • Promote discussions and facilitate the process for the creation of a structured grant program to support DAO initiatives, ensuring it provides resources for interested projects.
  • Establish a more efficient service provider selection process, ensuring that providers align with the DAO’s objectives and contribute effectively to its needs.
  • Moderate the forum to avoid spam and resolve conflicts. Also reporting to the DAO any improper action by any of the team members. (we request for admin/mod credentials and permissions).
  • Monitoring the compliance of proposals requiring periodic reporting and ensuring those involved to comply with such reporting.
  • Ensure proposals progress through their lifecycle by communicating votes and outcomes, engaging with Velora DAO delegates to address queries, facilitating submissions, providing advisory support for drafting and review, and ensuring compliance with voting requirements.
  • Analyze voting patterns and anticipate results to identify potential risks.
  • Being in charge of starting the different electoral processes to renew the positions in due time and form.
  • Organizing regular Community Calls, AMAs and/or meetings for specific purposes, generating reports based on both including transcripts, recordings, or a summary of what was discussed at each meeting.
  • Drafting quarterly reporting on DAO activity
  • To be a signer of the various multi-sigs that may be created to manage budgets, to make payments to service providers, contributors and others. It will also exercise oversight over payments and drive accountability if required.
  • Continue attracting top talent and key industry players to the DAO and the protocol and develop DAO Growth initiatives to increase activity and participation in the DAO.
  • Conduct governance experiments to identify the most effective mechanisms for collective decision-making and contributor rewards.
  • The above-mentioned roles absorb the DIP Program Manager role, as has been outlined, and we will continue to develop it as we have done so far.
  • With the focus on driving the DAO forward and contributing to an informed, engaged, and active community, we’ll commit to exploring initiatives to expand participation and attract talents that make up the Velora growth. The rather technical nature of the protocol demands for applicable knowledge on intent infrastructure, DeFi and partnerships and we’re set to attract those contributors with the right set of governance rails.

4.- SEEDGov - About us

SEEDGov is a dynamic and evolving vertical within the SEED Org ecosystem. We are no longer a delegation team as we were in our origins, we have grown, we have evolved, today we are much more. We have specialised in different governance in collaborating closely with Foundations and core teams in redesigning their DAO governance, frameworks and operations. In this link you can see the different roles and responsibilities we have and have had throughout the ecosystem.

We are a truly multidisciplinary team with diverse skills, including data analysts, tokenomics specialists, researchers, financials, devs, node specialists, marketing, community, and other profiles, and the whole team will be at the disposal of Velora DAO, not only the assigned team that will dedicate full time to the proposed task. We also involve the community by creating spaces to gather interested parties, promote dialogue, attract talent, and build in public.

After evaluating past methodologies and assessing the current state of governance in ParaSwap, the SEED team concluded in November 2024 that opening a delegation in ParaSwap was the most suitable approach at that time. Establishing a delegation was the right mechanism to promote diverse voices and active community participation, allowing us to be receptive to improvement proposals and build transparently. Moving forward, we recognize the need to engage more deeply with the protocol’s governance. This decision reflects our commitment to long-term collaboration and the understanding that our role within the DAO is evolving as the ecosystem continues to change.

5.- Deliverables and commitment

  • Deliver quarterly reports, 4 reports in total, reporting on the status of the DAO and its activity and the delegate participation.
  • Organize and host monthly or bimonthly Community Calls - as circumstances require - to discuss and update on protocol developments, DAO activity, delegate and community participation in voting and proposals, new partnerships and alliances, and other current topics, with the goal of transitioning to regular monthly Community Calls when the DAO’s activity justifies it.
  • Maintain at least ten active delegates who bring value and diversity of views to the DAO.

Means

This proposal does not require any additional Velora, external product or development.

Implementation Overview

We do not foresee any potential negative outcome of the present proposal and it is not expected for the DAO to derive any associated implementation action. The duration of the proposal will be of 12 months after its approval.

Time of Implementation

1 year, from April 2025 to March 2026, with a reevaluation period at 6 months in September 2025, during which the DAO may revoke or modify the agreement through a vote if deemed necessary.

A one-year term with a six-month review is appropriate for the proposed role given its scope and responsibilities. Since the tasks involve prioritizing initiatives, discussing proposals with the community, implementing them, measuring their impact, and making necessary adjustments, it is essential to have enough time to effectively execute each of these phases.

The six-month review serves as a checkpoint to assess initial progress, identify any necessary adjustments, and ensure that the work remains aligned with the established objectives. This structure provides a balance between flexibility and continuity, allowing initiatives the time needed to create impact while maintaining a control point to optimize their development.

The reports to be delivered, their content and KPIs have been detailed in the sections ‘New role - Scope - What we offer’ and ‘Deliverables and commitment’ above, we therefore remit to them.

Budget & Cost Breakdown

Budget

The proposal requires a total budget of 180,000 USD, to be paid as follows:

  • Fixed amount: 120,000 USD to be paid in USDC or ETH on a monthly basis of 10,000 USD per month:
    • If paid in ETH:
      • ETH will be transferred each month in quantity sufficient to cover the value of 10,000 USD
      • The value of ETH to determine the amount to be transferred is calculated at the time each transfer is approved and executed
    • USDC or ETH will be transferred within the last 5 days of each month.
    • This monthly fixed amount to be transferred in USDC or ETH will be calculated and disbursed based on the total fees collected by the protocol, prior to the distribution of 80% to stakers and 20% to the DAO treasury in accordance with the PSP 2.0 fees distribution system established in PSP-IPΔ22: PSP 2.0.
  • Performance amount: 1.5% of the revenue of the protocol up to a maximum of USD 60,000, to be calculated and paid on a quarterly basis up to a maximum of USD 15,000 per quarter, to be paid in PSP - or in the future new token it may eventually migrate to in accordance with Project Miro -:
    • Every quarter from April 2025, SEEDGov will be paid 1.5% of the protocol revenue up to a maximum of USD 15,000.
    • The source of truth for the calculation is the official ParaSwap analytics dashboard, especially the ‘Revenue - Last 90 days’ chart. In the event that this dashboard ceases to function, other sources will be used and discussed with the DAO.
    • Calculations and payments will be made in:
      • The first five days of July 2025, for the first quarter April-June,
      • The first five days of October 2025, for the second quarter July-September,
      • The first five days of January 2026, for the third quarter October-December,
      • The first five days of April 2026, for the fourth and last quarter January-March.
    • PSP - or in the future new token it may eventually migrate to in accordance with Project Miro - will be transferred in those dates in quantity sufficient to cover the value in USD of 1.5% of the last 90 days’ protocol revenue, with a cap of 15,000 USD per quarter.
    • The value of PSP - or the future token that replaces it - to determine the amount to be transferred is calculated at the time each transfer is approved and executed

As indicated above, the first fixed monthly payment shall be made by the end of April 2025 and the first performance quarter payment shall be made in the first days of July 2025.

USD costs are fixed, meaning that if the price of ETH and/or PSP - or the future token that replaces it - increases, the USD costs will remain the same.

In adition, as the role being created for the Governance Task Force will be that of a service provider and contributor to the DAO, accordingly, the payment of the monthly fixed amount will follow the same treatment as applied to other DAO service providers, such as Mimic and WakeUp Labs. That is, the monthly fixed amount to be transferred in USDC or ETH will be calculated and disbursed based on the total fees collected by the protocol, prior to the distribution of 80% to stakers and 20% to the DAO treasury, in accordance with the PSP 2.0 fees distribution system established in PSP-IPΔ22: PSP 2.0.

Payment Structure Rationale

The payment is structured this way because SEEDGov primarily needs to cover the monthly payroll of contributors assigned to the tasks with the budgeted funds. However, to demonstrate commitment to the protocol, a performance-related payment is established, so that a considerable part of our income is subject to and conditional on the future of the protocol. The 1.5% of the protocol revenue is not a random or arbitrary number, but because, according to the official ParaSwap Analytics dashboard, ParaSwap’s revenue over the last year (last 13 epochs = 364 days) was approximately 3 million USD. To reach the budgeted cap of $60,000 for the year, the protocol would need to increase its revenue by around 33%—a challenging target given the complexities and volatility of the crypto market. If the protocol maintains its current annual performance or experiences a decline in revenue, SEEDGov’s performance-based payments will remain well below the cap.

This approach balances SEEDGov’s budgetary needs to cover fixed monthly expenses while ensuring commitment and skin in the game toward ParaSwap/Velora.

Payment wallet

All payments will be transferred to the SEEDGov delegation wallet: 0x1a20c5106c11de13FE62ddE12BAdf5A04605A4b7

Payments may be made through any EVM-compatible chain, at the DAO’s discretion at any given time.

The GovCo @paraswap-govco will be responsible for calculating, approving and executing the corresponding monthly and quarterly transactions.

Cost Breakdown

This required amount covers SEEDGov’s operational expenses, not only of the team assigned to the specific tasks in ParaSwap/Velora, but, as mentioned in section ‘4.- SEEDGov - About us’ of the entire multidisciplinary team behind SEED Org that will provide assistance in different areas, such as data analysts, scalability, grants management, tokenomics specialists, researchers, financials, devs, node specialists, marketing, community and others.

Consequently, the resources to be allocated by SEEDGov to these proposed tasks are:

  • 1 Sr Gov Analyst Full time
  • 2 Sr Gov Analyst part time
  • SEED Org Experts Interconsultation

If the workload requires it, SEEDGov will, at its own cost, hire additional resources to adequately carry out its tasks and responsibilities.

Risk Assessment

We do not understand that the proposal has cons, and the pros and positive impact on the rest of the community, the ecosystem and the protocol, as indicated, are:

  • Formally assign the role and tasks of a Governance Facilitator.
  • Align the strategic priorities and define a strategic vision and mission for the DAO.
  • Achieve optimal and efficient coordination and synergies between the various actors and stakeholders of the DAO and the protocol.
  • Efficiently organize the DAO’s processes by establishing dedicated structures and frameworks for key focus areas.
  • Monitoring the compliance of proposals.
  • Continue attracting top talent and key industry players to the DAO and the protocol.
  • Encourage more active and quality participation in Velora governance.
  • Strengthen and improve governance processes.
  • Moderate the forum to avoid spam and resolve conflicts.

This proposal does not modify any code of the protocol, so no audits are required.

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Since SeedGov has already been handling these responsibilities in the DAO, we think this is a good way to formalize the relationship. As for the cost the DAO will pay for this service, we believe it’s fair and in line with market rates. In fact, it could be considered below market given all the responsibilities they’re taking on. For that reason, we strongly support electing SeedGov as the first Governance Facilitator of Paraswap.

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Thanks for the proposal!

I see strong added value in this initiative, as it introduces structure to the DAO’s operations by establishing a reliable coordination point—the “Facilitator” role.

I do have a couple of questions:

  • Alignment with Project Miro: I assume this role is being proposed in anticipation of increased governance-related activity. Could you share more insight into how this aligns with Project Miro’s trajectory and future expectations?
  • Budget: Would it be possible to offer different tiers of service? My reasoning is that if there’s a shared expectation that governance activity may not ramp up significantly in the near term, the full package might be seen as less cost-effective—though some core services would still be necessary and highly valuable.

If there’s a clear vision that the DAO will require the full suite of services, I believe this is a great proposal that delivers substantial value at a competitive budget—especially considering the alignment shown by accepting partial compensation in the protocol’s native token.

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Hi @jameskbh thank you for your considerations and feedback!

Indeed, the proposed role is aligned with, and has been proposed in anticipation of, the implementation of Project Miro. Moreover, many of the steps we have taken so far have already had this as an objective. The PGWG is a clear example of this, whose scope is to provide an appropriate framework for promoting the growth of the Protocol through the creation of a committee dedicated to growth tasks. The aim was for this structure to be in place when Project Miro is fully implemented, to complement the efforts of the Foundation and Laita in marketing, growth and integrations, and to take advantage of the momentum that the launch of Project Miro will bring. We will coordinate these efforts. The same for example with the proposed development of a grant program, as the PIP-56 has already allocated funds under the control of the DAO for incentives and grants, which will require a framework and structure for the efficient use of these found to achieve the goal of attracting talent to help develop solutions for the protocol. We will also be there to develop these frameworks and coordinate efforts.

All the steps we have taken and will take in the future will be with Project MirĂł at center scene, working together with the Foundation, Laita, the delegates, partners and stakeholders for the success of its implementation.

Contrary to what you mentioned, we believe - and we will make our best effort to ensure that happens - that governance activity in the DAO will steadily increase. Since we got involved and raised a very concerning scenario in October, to date, partly as a result of our initiatives and proactivity, and partly due to the good response from the community, activity in the DAO has increased significantly, and much of what we propose in the “Our Planned Actions” section is aimed at further increasing, sophisticating and professionalising the DAO’s activity.

As a simple example, we can mention the following:

  • In the immediate future, the DIP application is expected to re-open in 2 months time, so more delegates are expected to join the program, which will increase our tasks as program managers.
  • Governance structures are being developed, such as the PGWG, which is finalising the creation of a Growth Committee, as well as the first steps to establish the structure of a Treasury Manager and a Grant Program - aligned with Project Miro - all of which will increase our proposed tasks of not only promoting and defining its framework, but also, once established, acting as a liaison and coordinating efforts between these structures, the Foundation, Laita Labs and the rest of the stakeholders.
  • Various ideas that we have already started to develop in order to improve the governance processes, to improve the decision-making processes and to provide more security to the DAO, which we will present for discussion in the Forum, and which will involve responding to some inconsistencies that have been observed in the DAO recently.

To sum up, our work proposal is entirely aimed at increasing, sophisticating and professionalising the DAO’s activities, which, if it comes to pass, will also mean an increase in our proposed work.

As far as the budget is concerned, we are defining the cost structure as proposed, with a part in PSP token depending on the performance of the protocol, since our activity, in addition to the administrative tasks, is aimed not only at increasing the activity of the DAO as an end in itself, but also at having an impact on the profits of the protocol. This is the goal that motivated the creation of the PGWG and the Growth Committee, whose main objective is to generate growth for the protocol and new partners/integrations. Similarly, establishinhg the role of the Treasury Manager is not only to manage the treasury but also to ensure that it generates returns and income. Similar is the case of the Grant Program to be developed to attract talent to develop solutions for the Protocol, with the logical ulterior purpose of achieving a better product to expand its market share and revenues.

In other words, if we achieve the desired impact, with the performance amount in PSP token our incomes can increase (with a cap) according to the increase in the protocol’s revenues, i.e. without increasing the proportion or share of the DAO’s expenses to its revenues, and with the low cap (which is achieved with an increase of only 10% of the protocol’s revenues) our performance incomes will not increase much even if the protocol’s revenues do. On the contrary, if despite the expected increase in governance activity, this doesn’t impact in the Protocol’s revenues, or worse, market conditions negatively affect the Protocol’s revenues, our incomes will decrease despite the increase in our work, so our performance incomes will never be a greater weight in relation to the Protocol’s flow and revenues, and may even be reduced accordingly. This is the alignment we are trying to get across, we are totally committed to the Protocol.

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BTW, we would like to expressly thank Erik from @Avantgarde for the feedback provided and for helping us to structure the scheme of the proposal ‘Budget’ section.

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We have consistently been impressed by the services provided by the SEED team in the past across the different DAOs they are apart of. Their expertise in overseeing DAO operations, designing governance processes, and developing new frameworks has been instrumental in enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of DAOs. Notably, we think their management of the Delegate Incentive Program v1 and subsequent iterations, where they successfully distributed 1.5 million $ARB among over 30 delegates based on their contributions initially, has grown into a robust and in depth team and structure. If there was anywhere that would showcase a team’s capability to handle complex governance initiatives with precision and fairness, this is it.

The SEED team’s role as managers of the Governance Task Force in Everclear also demonstrates their ability to oversee DAO operations comprehensively. Their efforts in redesigning governance processes and developing new frameworks have contributed significantly to creating more robust and transparent organizational structures within the DeFi space. Given their proven track record and dedication to advancing decentralized governance, we are wholeheartedly in favor of continuing and expanding the Paraswap collaboration with the SEED team.

Budget wise, we think this is a very reasonable ask and something that is well worth. The revenue share angle is interesting and while novel, something worth trying. Our one feedback here is that particularly with the revenue share, and maybe with the proposal as a whole, an initial 6 month trial might make the most sense. As is common with a lot of DAO programs and new initiatives.

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Thank you @PGov for your words and support, we really appreciate it.

Regarding the 1 year extension, it was an issue that was specifically considered within the team, but as we stated and justified in the ‘Time of Implementation’ section, we finally agreed within the team that 1 year is the appropriate timeframe to plan various solutions that we want to implement in a phased manner over time, submit them for discussion in the forum, and eventually approve them by the DAO, implement them, and analyse their impact to propose possible adjustments. In any case, we propose a review of the agreement after 6 months, which can be cancelled or modified if the DAO deems it necessary.

We think that this is an appropriate balance between the time we believe is necessary to plan, implement and evaluate the impact of our work, and the logical control and power that the DAO must retain to revoke or modify the conditions in a period shorter at 6 months.

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As a passionate contributor to the ParaSwap DAO, I’m delighted and wholeheartedly support this Governance Task Force. With Project Miró lighting the path forward, this proposal feels like the perfect move to solidify DAOs governance framework, making it strong, transparent and ready to power our ecosystem’s next chapter.

The Task Force’s wide-reaching role, crafting DAO’s vision, aligning stakeholders, refining the PIP lifecycle and boosting community engagement is a brilliant foundation for what we’re building. Having teamed up with @SEEDGov on the PGWG, I’ve seen their knack for turning community vision into action and applaud them for this effort and DIP so far.

With this effort, stepping up as governance facilitators, they can ensure processes hum smoothly so efforts like the PGWG can dig into growth strategies uninterrupted setting the stage for something bigger like a Growth Committee that could spring from the PGWG’s work, taking those researched frameworks and executing to drive ParaSwap’s expansion long-term.

I must say defining these roles clearly is key to keeping the magic alive. The Task Force seems to excels at orchestrating governance—think process polish, stakeholder sync and resource stewardship—while the PGWG digs into growth planning, potentially handing off to a Growth Committee to execute. This feels like synergy to me, a relay race where each leg builds on the last. That said, I’d love @SEEDGov take on this:
With your team’s deep expertise in marketing, tokenomics and all the rest, how do you see the Task Force’s scope meshing with a future Growth Committee’s efforts?
Could those skills bridge both seamlessly or might overlap with the supposed Committee? I’m keen to hear how you envision this playing out.

Overall the proposal feels one time DAOs shot to lock in a dedicated team and a governance backbone that will maintain and fuel ParaSwap’s rise in DeFi.
I urge the community to join the discussion, let’s tap into @SEEDGov strengths and build an ecosystem that thrives together!

Kudos and LG !

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Seed has clearly shown professionalism and expertise in helping DAOs run more efficiently and transparently.

Having experts guide not just DAO management, but also the strategic direction of ParaSwap such as through data analysis, tokenomics support, grants management, and DAO expansion, is exactly what’s needed for sustainable growth.

As for the budget, it feels fair to me, not too much, not too little. Honestly, it’s will be good investment. DAOs need clear, transparent management to stay on track and thrive.

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Thank you very much for your kind words of support, we really appreciate it!

That’s a fair question. In our role as Governance Task Force we will coordinate, complement and support the efforts of the committees, working groups, and other future DAO’s structures. specifically the Growth Committee in this case. We see it as a unification, liason and coordination of efforts, where our expertise will be leveraged to drive and accelerate results.

We have changed the name of the proposal to ‘Velora Governance Task Force’, as well as some replacements or references in the text to ‘Velora’, given the brand new announcement of the protocol rebranding!

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Thanks for the additional information and for presenting thre reasoning behind some of the items! Happy to support the initiative.

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Taking into account feedback received from some delegates and stakeholders in regards this proposal, we believe it is necessary to make a clarification and express consistency with our activities since joining the DAO:

The administrative tasks that we, as the Governance Task Force, are proposing to take on as a result of the remarkable increase in the DAO’s activity that we have promoted, are not an end in itself, as its intended purpose is to have an impact on the growth of the Protocol, its activity, volume and revenue. In other words, organizing, structuring and professionalizing the DAO and attracting talent is not the endgame, but a necessary starting point and solid foundation for the DAO to provide real value and generate concrete impact for Protocol’s growth and success.

Our role has been — and will continue to deepen — with the sole objective of ensuring that the DAO has a tangible impact on the growth of the protocol and this has been our approach from the very beginning.

Our first major involvement with the DAO was the post, not coincidentally called ‘Driving Protocol Success through Optimized Governance’, which was a research and a comprehensive report on the state of the Protocol and the DAO towards mid to late 2024, and the path we the DAO should take to effectively make an impact on the growth and success of the Protocol.

It is with this objective in mind that we have taken the initiatives we have, in particular the formation of the ParaSwap Growth Working Group (PGWG), whose purpose is that ‘the DAO engage, collaborate and provide support with @Laita and ParaSwap @foundation in developing initiatives to support the growth of the ecosystem’ and ‘provide a framework for the DAO to execute the growth tasks that are identified and to follow the right path’.

The PGWG will be soon presenting its final work proposing the creation of a Growth Committee with a detailed framework, looking towards designing strategies for the growth of the Protocol. We as the Governance Task Force aim to have an important presence and participation (non-compensated) in this structure to coordinate its efforts and be the liaison with the other structures of the DAO, the Foundation, Laita and other stakeholders to avoid overlap and maximize its value.

Coincidentally, we have structured our payment proposal so that the amount of the performance payment depends solely on the protocol revenue, so that if the protocol revenue goes down, our payment will go down, and if the protocol revenue goes up, our payment will go up, but in that case setting a low cap (60,000usd/year).

In summary, we would like to reinforce once again that our task will continue to be to strengthen and professionalizing the DAO as a means, becoming the driving force for initiatives with concrete impact on the growth of the Protocol, its activity, and its revenue, and to be aligned with this, part of our payments will be tied to our success in achieving this.

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We appreciate the clarity and forward-thinking structure of this proposal.
This is an important role, and based on what we’ve seen since joining, it makes sense for SEED LATAM to take it on.
Formalizing the Governance Facilitator role feels timely as ParaSwapDAO enters a more mature phase of coordination and governance.
A few comments:

  1. We would prefer a different name for the role—“Facilitator” sounds more like a coordinator or scrum master. We’d rather see a hands-on, proactive role, and a title that reflects that.
  2. Given the one-year scope, we’d like to define a minimum number of proposals per month from SEED that aim to improve ParaSwap (these don’t necessarily have to be budget-related).
  3. Beyond the quarterly reporting, have you considered specific KPIs or signals the DAO should use to assess alignment with the proposal’s objectives?

Looking forward to seeing this structure in action.

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I view this initiative as a long-term investment for the DAO. There is no doubt that SEEDGov’s roles and activities have positively impacted both the DAO and its governance processes. Approving this proposal poses minimal risk to the DAO, particularly given SEEDGov’s past contributions, which have demonstrably increased DAO activity. We sincerely admire their dedication and efforts.

That said, I have reservations about whether these efforts will directly translate into improved protocol revenue or positively affect the $PSP token’s short-term price performance. This is where the DAO assumes a more speculative risk. While the initiative holds clear long-term value—as an investment in the DAO’s infrastructure and maturity—its ability to yield short-term protocol performance improvements remains uncertain, even with the Protocol Growth Working Group (PGWG) involved. This is an area we should explore experimentally and monitor closely.

Regarding the compensation structure, the 1.8% revenue-share model, capped at $15,000 per quarter, offers valuable budget predictability, which I value. However, I’d like to raise a few concerns and invite corrections if I’ve misinterpreted any details:

  1. Based on current protocol revenue— $1.26M over the last 90 days—the 1.8% performance fee already exceeds the $15K quarterly cap. Given that this initiative prioritizes long-term benefits over immediate results, I propose delaying performance fee payments until the second quarter. The full payments would still be honored, just deferred by one quarter.

  2. Since the $15K cap was already reached last quarter, there’s a risk of incentive misalignment. If protocol revenue grows—potentially due to SEEDGov’s efforts—the current structure limits their marginal incentive to drive further growth. as You’ve expressed interest in the positive performance of our token, so I suggest subjecting the performance fees to a vesting schedule, akin to delegate compensation. This could better align SEEDGov’s incentives with the protocol’s long-term success and ensure fairness relative to other DAO actors, such as delegates.

  1. Lastly, could you elaborate on how you calculated the 10% figure? Based on my calculations and the mentioned dashboard, protocol revenue was $3.1M over the last 12 months, making 1.8% approximately $55,800 annually—or $13,950 quarterly, close to the $15K cap. It seems an increase of 7-8% in annual revenue (to ~$3.35M) would push the quarterly fee to ~$15,066, hitting your max cap, not 10%. Clarification here would help.

Overall, my concerns center on the performance fees and their calculations. I’d welcome any additional details to address them.

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Thank you @SEEDGov for the proposal.

As we’ve said many times now we’re very happy to have you lead the DAO as your team has always been a pleasure to work with, and we think the DAO has made significant progress over the last 6 months or so under your guidance.

We’ve provided significant feedback to this proposal already, but will for transparency’s sake reiterate the most important points of said feedback:

  • We asked for the initial sum (160k) to be split up into a base fee and a performance-tied fee and provided a number of potential solutions.
  • Further asked for the bonus-related thresholds to be lowered, as we felt that there wasn’t enough to incentivise growth as targets were already being hit under current revenue (similar to what @Mehdi is arguing above).

It’s worth acknowledging that current 12-month trailing revenue figures were significantly boosted under last quarter, and it’s too early to say where the protocol’s new “floor” is. The protocol’s revenue trend is seemingly pointing upwards, but it could also go back down to past trend figures (and thus lower the bonus payout).

While we do feel the rev share still looks slightly on the higher side in relation to the 60k cap, again it’s important to recognise how volatile and unpredictable protocol revenue is at this point in time. Additionally, the rate is clearly at a discount compared to other similar, US-anchored payouts, so all in all we feel that it’s a good deal—though we would be willing to up the cap if the % share was lowered to incentivise further growth.

One addition might be to add a threshold on the lower end, that is, if revenue goes below say 2m, the bonus is withheld.

All in all, we’re more bullish on the DAO and protocol with @SEEDGov by our side.

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Hi @wakeuplabs thanks for the feedback and your questions!

The proposed name was chosen because we believe that both our work so far and the tasks we plan to undertake go beyond those of a classic “Governance Facilitator”. That’s why we went with “Governance Task Force.” That said, we see this as a minor detail that we do not attach importance to, so if there is consensus we can change the name.

We do not agree with setting monthly proposals as a general objective, either for us in the proposed role, or for delegates (which is why it was not included in Paraswap’s DIP or any other delegation where we made similar proposals), as this would encourage the submission of minor, low-quality and unimportant proposals with the sole purpose of meeting this objective, but which would not add value to the DAO, and worse, would only generate noise and spam. There are activities, such as the formation of the PGWG, which would not be a proposal per se, but which are intended to have a much greater impact than a generic proposal submitted for the sole purpose of fulfilling the proposal submission objective.

We understand that it is difficult to establish objective measurable indicators for what is largely an administrative and strategic management role, but the closest we can come is to measure the quantity and quality of DAO participation and debates, the number of active delegates, PSP voting participation, the number of proposals submitted for voting, and in general the overall perception of being in the presence of an active, orderly DAO, with functioning structures that provide value, resulting in a DAO that supports the efforts of the Foundation and Laita in the growth of the Protocol.

Our Driving Protocol Success through Optimized Governance post and the analysis we conducted on the state of the DAO at that time (October 2024) serve as the baseline. Likewise, April 2025 —as the official start of our proposed new role— will mark another key reference point. From these two milestones, we will track the evolution and impact of the relevant indicators over the coming months. In the long term, this ongoing data collection will allow us to carry out a comprehensive impact assessment.

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Thank you @Mehdi for your comments and questions—they give us the opportunity to elaborate on several points we hadn’t yet detailed in order to present a clear and consistent proposal.

We fully agree that the impact of the DAO on the growth of the Protocol is uncertain as it depends on future circumstances, but we are certain that in order to have this impact the DAO needs to mature, professionalise and structure itself better than it does at present. Furthermore, the uncertainty of the DAO’s impact on the Protocol’s income is increased by market circumstances and also by the impact of the Foundation’s and Laita’s efforts. It must be a joint effort between these parties, which will also be subject to market conditions, i.e. factors external to Velora and its DAO, which confirms the uncertainty that you point out, but not because of that uncertainty about the future should the DAO not make its efforts, and for that, as we said, we understand that it is essential that it be better structured and prepared than it is now and compared to what it was in mid-late 2024 when it was in a state of almost total inactivity, otherwise we can affirm that the impact of the DAO will undoubtedly be zero.

Please note that the calculation of the last 90 days revenue, i.e. the period between January and March, is marked by an absolutely exceptional event such as the millionaire transactions that the Bybit hacker performed on ParaSwap on February 21, which has resulted in the protocol’s revenues in epoch 28 being exceptional in comparison to the protocol’s history.

This unfortunate hack event, although it has brought extraordinary revenue to the protocol, will hardly and hopefully not be repeated, so we understand that it is not appropriate to use the revenue of the last 90 days as a rule when it has been marked by this absolutely exceptional event.

Consequently, by the time the first quarter performance amount of our new role is calculated—at the beginning of July, covering the April to June period—the impact of the Bybit hack transactions on ParaSwap that occurred on 21 February will no longer be relevant. As such, it is currently impossible to accurately estimate what the protocol’s revenue will be for the 90-day period ending in July, as it will depend entirely on what happens in the coming 90-day period. Therefore, using the current revenue figures from the past 90 days—which are significantly affected by an exceptional and one-off event—to project or assess the next 90-day period, which only started 7 days ago, would be misleading.

We have not set a vesting period for the PSP portion of the performance amount, since under the proposed structure, these payments are received on a quarterly basis—that is, they are already delayed by one, two, or three months relative to when the work is actually performed. This is different from the case of the DIP that you mention, where delegates receive their compensations on a regular monthly basis rather than quarterly.

As we have already said, epoch 28 is absolutely exceptional, as it is marked by the millionaire eight transactions that the Bybit hacker carried out on ParaSwap on 21 February, generating an exceptional revenue of 44.67 ETH at an ETH price of $2,661, i.e. this situation generated an exceptional revenue valued at the time it was generated at $118,866 USD (all this data is based on the eight transactions listed in this post). In fact, the DAO has decided to return to Bybit 40.23 ETH corresponding to this epoch 28, valued at the time of its execution (21st February) at $2,661 per ETH, i.e. they have returned a value equivalent to $107,052, reducing the revenue of this epoch by this amount.

Based on this, the last 13 epochs (364 days), from epoch 16 to 28, the protocol’s revenue has been around $ 3.1M, as you mention, but affected by the $118,866 exceptionally generated by the Bybit hack activity, which hopefully will not happen again. So, after deducting these exceptional revenues, the amount of $ 3M of annual revenues has been taken as a base, so that in order to reach the maximum annual performance of $ 60k, the protocol will have to reach an annual revenue of $ 3.333M, i.e. an increase of approximately 10%.

Coincidentally, the 13 epochs before the 28, from the 15 to the 27, show a protocol revenue of $ 2.948M. Considering that in order to reach the maximum performance amount with a cap of $ 60k per year, an annual protocol revenue of $ 3.333M would be necessary, this means that the protocol revenue would have to increase by 13%.

These are the calculations we have made with the assistance of @Avantgarde, whom we thank again.

We know that it is impossible to estimate the future, as it depends on many factors, including external factors to the DAO and the protocol, such as market conditions, but rather than requiring a fixed amount that is comfortable and secure for us, we have made the greatest effort to structure a proposal that balances covering the operational costs of SEEDGov, which requires paying the payroll of its contributors, and at the same time subordinating part of our income to the revenues and success of the protocol with a low cap, in order to align incentives.

We hope will bring clarity.

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Lastly, in response to a concern raised privately by several stakeholders, we believe it’s important to explicitly clarify in the proposal that the role being created for the Governance Task Force will be that of a service provider and contributor to the DAO. Accordingly, the payment of the monthly fixed amount will follow the same treatment as applied to other DAO service providers, such as Mimic and WakeUp Labs. That is, the monthly fixed amount to be transferred in USDC or ETH will be calculated and disbursed based on the total fees collected by the protocol, prior to the distribution of 80% to stakers and 20% to the DAO treasury, in accordance with the PSP 2.0 fees distribution system established in PSP-IPΔ22: PSP 2.0. Consequently, the proposal has been edited to clarify this issue.

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Thanks for the clarity—everything makes sense now.

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Hey @SEEDGov , we appreciate all the work you’ve done for Velora so far. Your team have clearly played a huge role in putting things together for VeloraDAO from launching the delegate program to improving the governance framework and getting the community more involved.

That said, we do have a couple of questions we’d love to get some clarity on:

  • Do you have any KPIs in mind for how many initiatives you’re planning to put forward over the next year? And are there any future proposals already in the pipeline?
  • Also, with the Governance Task Force role, will this opportunity be open for community members to join and contribute, or will it be managed exclusively by SEEDGov?
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