Having worked with SeedGov for the past few months, we can attest for both the quality of the work they have delivered during this trial period, as well as the professionalism of the members of the team. For this reason, we want to express our support for the implementation of the task force to assist with the growth of the DAO and the decentralization of its operations.
One of most common concerns we have received internally regarding this proposal is regarding the resource scope and objectives, which we see has also been discussed at length prior to this reply. To reiterate, we believe the ask to be reasonable, so long as the main focus of the Task Force remains on growing the protocol usage and revenue of Velora first and foremost. As long as the future initiatives and committees remain aligned with this vision, we are excited to see the implementation of this roadmap going forward.
As we mentioned to @wakeuplabs, we donât believe the number of initiatives or submitted proposals should be a goal or KPI â not for us, and not for the delegates either. This would only incentivize submitting proposals just to meet a quota, without considering their quality, value, or relevance. In the end, the objective might be technically met, but without creating real impact â and worse, it could lead to spam of low-quality proposals submitted just to hit the target.
We have several proposals currently in development and others in the pipeline, some led by us and others in collaboration with different stakeholders, which will be presented for discussion. As an example, weâre working on areas like treasury management â where we see a clear and prioritary need for structure â as well as topics related to grants.
We conceive the role of the Governance Task Force as being managed by us. However, as outlined in our proposal, our role also includes promoting and supporting â together with other stakeholders and DAO members who wish to collaborate â the creation of new structures the DAO needs to achieve its goals. One example of this is the PGWG, which will soon present its final outcome proposing a structure and framework for growth.
@Laita team, thank you very much for your words of support, we really appreciate them, and we look forward to continuing to work together in this new phase we are proposing.
Based on and in response to the feedback and suggestions weâve received both in this thread and privately, weâve decided to revise and edit the proposal in order to reduce the performance fee from 1.8% to 1.5% of protocol revenue, while maintaining the annual cap of $60,000 (quarterly cap of $15,000).
This means that, in order to reach the cap, the protocolâs annual revenue would need to increase by 33%, rather than the 10% we had originally stated in the initial proposal. Otherwise, the performance fee will remain below the maximum.
We believe this decision further reinforces both our commitment and alignment with the protocol, as well as the long-term incentives to ensure that the DAO plays a role in driving the protocolâs growth and success.
Thank you for this proposal. In my opinion, @SEEDGov has already brought significant value to the DAO. Becoming its Governance Facilitator makes sense and aligns with their skills and competencies.
The recent rebranding of ParaSwap as Velora also presents a great opportunity to enhance governance mechanisms and improve DAO efficiency. Most major DAOs have a service provider fulfilling this key role of facilitating governance. For instance, in Arbitrum, Entropy is a critical pillar in organizing and coordinating all stakeholders.
For the Velora protocol to grow, increase its market share, and boost revenue, it is crucial to be supported by an organized DAO. A Governance Task Force, a clear framework, and regular follow-ups will enable all stakeholdersâDelegates, the Foundation, Laita, Service Providers, Committees, etc.âto contribute their best value.
Finally, I appreciate SEEDGovâs willingness to adjust the proposal budget ( that is coherent and aligned with industry standards) based on delegate feedbacks and to modify the performance fee.
As many other delegates have already attested, we believe that the @SEEDGov team is highly competent is composed of high context members who have an intricate understanding of various DAOsâ operations. Their stewardship during this recent revival that Velora DAO has seen evidences their capacity to institute results.
In our eyes, the fixed monthly fee is on par with what we wouldâve expected, taking into account the rates paid for similar roles in other DAOs, while also factoring in the current size of the ParaSwap protocol & DAO. The more difficult aspect to properly iron out is the revenue-driven compensation. This is especially the case since attribution of revenue is seldom backed by increased governance activityâalthough is isnât necessarily the case. This is more so a matter of what the justification behind the rev-based compensation is. Is it present as a ârewardâ for increasing revenue, even if that revenueâs genesis is perhaps arbitrary or subject to multiple different variables? Or is the ârewardâ generally representative of scaled compensation that occurs as a business grows?
To substantiate on the latter point, think of a startup that evolves into a more established company. As the business scales, employee compensation tends to rise accordinglyânot necessarily because each individual is directly responsible for the growth but because they are contributing to and sustaining a more complex, higher-output organization. Under this view, the revenue-based bonus functions less as a reward for performance and more as a structural adjustment to reflect increased demands, complexity, and risk that come with scale.
In truth, both interpretations are valid, but clarity on the intent behind the rev-share model would help better align expectations between contributors and the DAO.
Attribution Model
Description
Recommended Compensation Structure
Direct Attribution
Contributor actions can be clearly linked to measurable revenue impact.
Tiered Performance Bonus (e.g. step-ladder model or rev-share uncapped with higher ceilings). Caps on this could even be removed.
Partial Attribution
Contributor actions may influence revenue, but impact is diffused or indirect.
Performance Bonus with Cap + KPIs â include measurable non-revenue indicators like partnerships via VGC or more delegate engagement, etc.
Structural Contribution
Contributor supports long-term systems, coordination, or operational scale.
Revenue-Scaled Compensation â e.g. fixed fee with inflationary buffer or capped bonus that grows with protocol scale, regardless of attribution. This is where the current proposal seems to be.
Speculative/Uncertain Attribution
Impact on revenue is unclear or confounded by market conditions.
Deferred or Vesting Bonus â performance bonus is deferred, vests over time, and contingent on sustained protocol performance.
Perhaps we can base the revenue on Structural Contribution for the first six months and then reevaluate its status during an interim review. The main reason we says this is to best align Seedâs incentives with that of the protocol as a whole. And in this scenario, we believe both entites fare better.
First off, thank you to @SEEDGov for a comprehensive proposal. Itâs clear to us that formalizing a Governance Task Force is a timely step as Velora is scaling up its DAO operations. We share the sentiment of others in this thread who highlighted the value of SEEDGovâs past contributions and professionalism. From Proxyâs perspective, we focus on transparency, data-informed governance, and accountability, and this proposal checks all of those boxes.
Thereâs strong consensus that SEEDGov has already been de facto performing many facilitator duties, so formally empowering them is logicalâ. The scope outlined â from coordinating strategic vision to moderating the forum â addresses valuable needs of the DAO. We sometimes see core teams or foundations end up handling governance housekeeping. Here, we have an independent team stepping up to bolster decentralization and continuity. The budget also appears reasonable for the extensive responsibilities. As Argonaut noted, the cost is fair and potentially below market given the workload. Another strength is SEEDGovâs track record of delivering tangible improvements in a short time. The formation of the ParaSwap Growth Working Group (PGWG), the revamped proposal lifecycle, and the Delegate Program are concrete outcomes that have increased participation.
One area of constructive debate is the compensation structure â specifically the performance-based component. Proxy strongly values aligning incentives with outcomes, so weâre glad to see part of the payment in PSP tied to protocol revenue. This shows SEEDGov has âskin in the game.â We were going to recommend revisiting the percentage at mid-term, and if protocol revenues were trending higher or lower than expected, the DAO could adjust it. However, since SEEDGov changed the percentage to 1.5% (meaning the protocolâs annual revenue would need to increase by 33% to hit the cap), weâre happy to move forward as is.
On the topic of expected output, we agree with SEEDGovâs response that setting a hard quota of X proposals per month is not the right approach. Weâd rather see a few high-impact proposals or initiatives.
Looking forward to voting in favor of this, thanks again for the discussion.
Regarding this question, we believe the justification involves a bit of both approaches, though it leans more toward the second. The performance amount is a tiered structure based on protocol growth, designed to tie SEEDâs revenues directly to the protocolâs performance and income. In other words, our compensation only increases if the protocol succeeds and does not increase if the protocol doesnât grow.
The goal is to align incentives with the protocol, ensuring that our share of income doesnât grow more than the protocolâs own revenue. To avoid any potential abuse, such as SEEDâs income growing exponentially just because the protocol does, weâve set a low cap that represents a fair and reasonable cost by industry standards.
Initially, we considered requesting a a pure fixed compensation, but we believe this hybrid approach is more aligned with the spirit of long-term collaboration, as it increases skin in the game and commitment to the protocolâs success, and again, within a low capped structure to prevent disproportionate compensation.
That said, the proposal includes a reevaluation period at 6 months, in September 2025, during which the DAO may revoke or modify the agreement if deemed necessary, providing an opportunity to revisit how this first phase has worked.
Given the 7-day debate period for this proposal has concluded a few days ago and a fruitful debate has taken place, during which we made two modifications to the original proposal, we communicate that, in accordance with the PIP Lifecycle recently approved, we are ending the debate stage and initiating the 2-day frozen period. After this period we will submit the proposal to snapshot.
Thank you all!
Thanks for the response @SEEDGov really appreciate the detailed answers.
We totally agree that focusing on quality over quantity makes sense, and weâre aligned with that approach. We just wanted to make sure there are proposals already being planned so thereâs a clear path forward, and itâs great to hear youâre already working on areas like treasury management and grants.
Also appreciate the clarification on the Governance Task Force setup. While itâll be managed by your team, weâre glad to hear there will still be opportunities for others in the DAO to contribute through new structures and initiatives.
With that said, weâll be voting in favor of the proposal and are looking forward to whatâs ahead!
In accordance with PIP-62, which approved the creation of the Governance Task Force, we inform the community that the first quarterly period (AprilâJune 2025) has been completed. As such, it is time to calculate the performance amount as outlined in the aproved proposal:
*Screenshot taken at the time of this post, July 2 at 5pm UTC.
Therefore, the 1.5% quarter performance amount (cap to 15,000 USD) due to SEEDGov for the AprilâJune quarter amounts to 8,388.54 USD.
As approved, this amount is to be paid in PSP tokens at the equivalent value of 8,388.54 USD to be valued at the time of transfer.
As stipulated, we request that the PSP equivalent to 8,388.54 USD be transferred to the SEEDGov delegation wallet: 0x1a20c5106c11de13FE62ddE12BAdf5A04605A4b7
Quarterly Report
Additionally, given that the AprilâJune 2025 quarter ended two days ago, we are currently processing the final data and metrics in order to publish the first quarterly report on DAO activity in the next few days as previously committed.
