Velora Revenue Performance in Epoch #38

Hello everyone,

I would like to raise a discussion regarding Velora’s protocol revenue during the current Epoch #38, which appears to be significantly lower than in previous epochs.

Specifically, it would be helpful to better understand:

  • What factors contributed to the relatively low revenue generation in this epoch (e.g., market conditions, utilization changes, fee structure, integrations, or other operational considerations)?

  • Whether this outcome was expected or if it indicates an underlying issue that should be addressed going forward.

In addition, I would appreciate clarification on the operational side:

  • If protocol revenue is insufficient to fully fund Laita Labs’ ongoing work, what contingency plans are in place?

  • Would this involve treasury support, changes to scope or pacing of development, adjustments to the economic model, or alternative funding mechanisms?

More broadly, it would be valuable to hear:

  • Laita Labs’ perspective on the sustainability of the current revenue model.

  • Any forward-looking considerations, risks, or ideas being evaluated to improve revenue consistency across epochs.

Thank you in advance for any insights or clarifications.

5 Likes

Thanks for raising this up. We took a closer look at the Velora dashboard data to better understand what might be driving the lower revenue in Epoch 38 and wanted to share a few observations.

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While acknowledging that Epoch 38 is still ongoing, the current revenue figure stands out as materially lower than prior epochs. Even accounting for the fact that the epoch is incomplete, the pacing so far appears well below historical norms, which makes it reasonable to look beyond timing effects alone.

Looking at trading activity more broadly, the most obvious driver appears to be a sharp contraction in overall volume. Monthly trading volume has declined significantly over the past several weeks, with December showing a clear step down compared to October and November.

This decline is especially pronounced on Ethereum, which continues to account for the majority of Velora’s volume. Ethereum volume dropped substantially from November to December, and given its weight in the overall mix, this alone has an outsized impact on total protocol volume and revenue, even if activity on other chains is comparatively more stable.

At the same time, user activity does not appear to have declined to the same extent as volume. Active address metrics over the last month and last three months remain relatively healthy, and daily activity by chain shows volatility but no clear collapse in participation. This divergence between relatively stable user counts and sharply lower volume suggests the decline is more likely driven by reduced trade sizes or the absence of large flows, rather than broad user churn.

One plausible explanation is that some high volume or fee sensitive orderflow, such as whale trades, market makers, or integrator driven flows, may have paused or rerouted during this period. A relatively small number of large flows can account for a disproportionate share of total volume, so changes in their behavior can have an outsized impact on volume and revenue while leaving user metrics largely intact.

In that context, it may also be useful to consider broader routing dynamics across the ecosystem. For example, large frontends such as Aave have shifted a significant portion of their orderflow to Cowswap rather than Velora. We do not have clear evidence that the current volume decline is directly related to this change, particularly given that Aave’s routing decision occurred back in June while the sharp volume contraction we are observing is much more recent. This timing mismatch suggests the current drop is unlikely to be explained by that factor alone. However, it does illustrate how sensitive large scale, fee sensitive flows can be to routing design, execution mechanics, and effective fee stacking.

Historically, when Aave used Velora as the swap router on AAVE, Velora acted as the primary execution layer for frontend swaps and earned its standard protocol-level fees from routing activity. In parallel, the Aave DAO benefited from Velora’s referral and positive slippage capture mechanism, which redirected value generated by swaps on the Aave frontend directly to the DAO treasury without introducing additional fees for users. Under this setup, users benefited from a seamless swap experience, Velora earned execution-related fees as the router, and the DAO captured referral-related revenue generated through its own frontend.

Following the transition to CoWSwap as the primary swap provider on AAVE, this structure changed. Velora is no longer part of the execution path for swaps routed through the Aave frontend and therefore no longer earns swap-related fees from Aave-originated activity.

This raises a reasonable question as to whether this structural change, combined with weaker market conditions, could be one of several contributing factors to the observed decline in volume and, by extension, protocol revenue. In particular, it may be relevant for fee-sensitive or high-volume flows, where changes in effective fees and execution paths can meaningfully influence routing decisions.

That said, we do not have enough information to draw a definitive conclusion. The timing does not line up cleanly, and it is entirely possible that the current decline is driven primarily by broader market dynamics rather than any single integration or routing decision. As such, this should be viewed as a hypothesis rather than a conclusion.

Fee data appears to track volume closely as well. Both protocol revenue and partner fees compress in November and December, which points toward a volume driven effect rather than anything obviously abnormal in the fee structure or routing based on the available data.

Putting this together, our current read is that the lower revenue in Epoch 38 is primarily driven by reduced volume, with Ethereum’s slowdown and the absence of large flows likely playing a key role. It would be helpful to hear from the team whether this pattern was expected, whether revenue is typically back loaded within an epoch, and whether any known high volume flows or integrators changed behavior during this period.

8 Likes

Thanks, @Curia, for the detailed data breakdown!

I want to double down on the point regarding the Aave interface transition to CoW Swap, as I believe this is a structural issue that makes Velora more vulnerable to market downturns.

While the exact timing of the recent drop doesn’t perfectly align with the Aave switch, the impact is likely being felt more acutely now. In a bull market or high-volume environment, retail flow can mask the loss of a major B2B partner. However, when general market volume contracts (as we see now on Ethereum), the absence of that sticky, high-value “backstop” volume from a major integrator like Aave becomes glaringly obvious.

We are likely seeing the compound effect of Market Beta (general volume drop) + Idiosyncratic Risk (loss of key integrator flow).

Call to Delegates & Impact Evaluation
We would like to invite the delegates and the team to not view the drop in volume merely as “bad market conditions,” but as a potential signal to re-evaluate our B2B value proposition. We might need to quantify the opportunity cost here.

  • Question: Can we estimate the volume routed through the Aave frontend in before and after the switch to visualize exactly what “base layer” volume was lost?

Proposed Mitigations
If the primary driver for Aave’s switch was related to surplus capture or execution mechanisms (features CoW Swap aggressively markets to DAOs), we need to address this gap directly. We would like to propose the following mitigations for discussion:

  1. Competitive Gap Analysis: We need a clear, honest internal report on why Aave Labs switched. Was it purely revenue share, or was it MEV protection/surplus capture mechanics? If Velora’s product is superior in price execution but lags in “DAO value capture,” we need to adjust our integrator fee models immediately.
  2. “Win-Back” or Diversification Strategy:
  • Targeted Re-engagement: Can we approach the Aave DAO (or Aave Labs) with a revised proposal that offers better terms or specific features they felt were missing?
  • Aggressive BD for Alternatives: If Aave is off the table, we must aggressively target other lending frontends (e.g., Spark, Morpho, or smaller forks) to replace that lost institutional flow.
  1. Integrator Incentive Program: We should consider a temporary “Integrator Stimulus” program for Epoch 39/40 to incentivize wallets and dApps to prioritize Velora routing, helping to smooth out volume volatility while we fix the longer-term structural issues.

The drop might be a warning. We cannot rely solely on retail users to sustain protocol revenue; regaining dominance in the B2B/Integrator market is critical.

3 Likes

Appreciate the data, @Curia.

As you mentioned, there are multiple factors that have affected Velora’s revenue.

  1. Market decline which affected all trading venues.
  2. Losing Aave as our B2B partner.
  3. Rise of orderbook DEXs like Hyperliquid, Ligher etc.

Now let’s dig deeper into the fee structure with a quick comparison on the cost of buying ETH on Velora versus Hyperliquid, focusing on a simple ETH/USDC spot market swap with taker execution.

Fee structure overview

  • Velora
    • Charges a flat 15 bps UI fee on most swaps.
    • On top of that, users still pay:
      • underlying DEX LP fees (~5 bps), and
      • gas (roughly $5–15 depending on the network).
  • Hyperliquid
    • Uses tiered maker/taker fees based on 14-day volume.
    • At the lowest tier, spot taker fees are ~6–7 bps.
    • Using USDC as the quote asset gives a ~20% discount, bringing effective taker fees to ~5–5.6 bps.
    • No gas fees for the user.

Example: Buying 1 ETH at $3,000

Assuming a market swap with no slippage:

  • Velora
    • UI fee (15 bps): ~$4.50
    • DEX fee (~5 bps): ~$1.50
    • Gas: ~$5–15
    • Total cost: ~$11–21
  • Hyperliquid (Tier 0)
    • Fee (~5.6 bps): ~$1.68
    • Gas: $0
    • Total cost: ~$1.5–2

Conclusion :For simple spot trades, Hyperliquid is clearly cheaper, even at the lowest fee tier. Velora still makes sense for more complex routing and fragmented liquidity, but when it comes to pure spot execution, fee competitiveness really matters—especially as orderbook DEXs keep gaining traction.

That said, there are other factors that could justify this, such as incentives, speculation around another airdrop, and a superior UX, which I haven’t examined here.


Agreed. If CowSwap has B2B features that Velora doesn’t, we should move fast to close that gap. Otherwise, we risk falling behind, especially as competition keeps tightening with perp DEXs now supporting spot pairs.
Further More, we should also think bigger and come up with a solid plan to stay competitive on protocol fees against orderbook DEXs like Hyperliquid and Lighter.

6 Likes

This clarifies that Velora’s strength isn’t in simple vanilla swaps anymore, but in complex routing and intent execution. We fully endorse the idea of an “Integrator Stimulus” for the upcoming epochs; we need to aggressively incentivize aggregators and wallets to route through Velora.

2 Likes

The Epoch 38 revenue report is valuable for understanding how Velora’s revenue is actually being generated and where there may be room for improvement.

One key takeaway is the need to better align activity with revenue. If certain routes or pools are driving volume without proportional revenue, this may signal opportunities to adjust fees, incentives, or routing priorities in future epochs.

Looking ahead, areas such as fee optimization on high-volume flows, reviewing incentive efficiency, and focusing on the most profitable use cases could help improve revenue performance. Pairing this data with deeper user behavior analysis would also support more informed decisions.

Overall, reports like this strengthen data-driven governance and provide a solid foundation for iterating toward higher and more sustainable revenue in the next epochs.

We are very interested how Velora’s revenue mix is evolving beyond simple swaps and increasingly reflecting the value of complex routing and intent-based execution. This suggests that our competitive advantage may not be on vanilla volume but on differentiating services that capture higher value per trade.

Overall, we think the observation about revenue trends underscores the need for a more forward-looking incentive framework: if integrators and partners are key drivers of that differentiated flow, then aligning incentives toward those entities could compound protocol usage and diversify revenue sources. We should be cautious about over-indexing on short-term rebates without clear tracking of downstream adoption, since rewards disconnected from sustainable usage risk inflating costs without durable growth.

1 Like

Thanks for the solid addition, I am inclined in the same direction and I’d say spot on about the volume contraction. One angle that stands out to me is how orderbook-style competitors (Hyperliquid, Lighter, etc.) are pulling away simple, high-volume spot trades with much tighter economics however its not the same as holding assets in your wallet, security here far superior but while we dominate on complex/intent routing, those basic flows still represent a big chunk of potential revenue.

What if we contemplate a temporary “High-Volume Path Fee Optimization” for a specific Epoch ? Target the top 5-10 most traded pairs (e.g., ETH/USDC, WBTC/USDC on Ethereum) with a dynamic or reduced fee tier specifically for trades above a certain size threshold aimed at recapturing whale/MM flows without cannibalising our edge in multi-hop trades.

We could pair it with targeted outreach to a few market makers for testing.This could give us quick data on elasticity and help bridge to longer-term integrator stimulus ideas. Thoughts?

Hope you all have had a great time off !

1 Like