DAPG - [jameskbh]

Identifying title of the idea:
Introduce seVLR Voting rights: Power to define governance-selected fee advantages for specific pairs

DAO-recognized name:
jameskbh

Individual or Organization?:
Individual contributor

Twitter handle:
@jameskbh


Details of the idea:

Currently, seVLR is only used for governance-related proposals. The aim here is to introduce another relevant utility for staked token holders: weekly/bi-weekly voting for seVLR holders to decide which specific trading pairs on Velora receive fee advantages (discounts or rebates). This is a utility upgrade, expanding seVLR from passive revenue share to an active right to influence how Velora fees are applied at the pair level.

Important to note (as proposed):

  • This does not reallocate fees elsewhere within the protocol.
  • It selectively applies fee advantages to the pairs chosen by governance.

This mechanism can target strategic Velora pairs, such as:

  • pairs that Velora wants to bootstrap (new assets, new chains, etc.)
  • pairs with partners/integrators who would benefit from incremental volume
  • pairs where lower fee → meaningful volume response → higher revenue feedback loop

This is a governance-based “volume growth engine” with strong alignment: By letting seVLR holders actively choose these pairs every epoch, the staking asset becomes a capital allocation power, not just a passive revenue share.


How will this idea help VLR growth:

  • Increases the value of locking VLR into seVLR (goes from receiving rewards → active influence) - it may even evolve to a “voting incentives market”
  • stimulates partners/market makers to acquire seVLR to support their preferred pairs
  • creates recurring demand for locking VLR
  • selective fee advantages can increase volume → increasing total revenue
    (lower fee → higher flow → higher net income)

Mapped KPIs or expected impact:

  • seVLR total locked value increase
  • increase in volume on pairs selected by vote
  • net protocol revenue impact week over week

Preliminary feasibility assessment:

Medium/High feasibility.

The mechanism is aligned with proven veTOKEN governance models in the industry, and the creation of a specific snapshot space for voting is not very complex.

Velora already has infrastructure for fee-based payouts (referral program), so rebates could reuse that pipeline.


How will the idea be implemented?

  • Create a new Snapshot space for seVLR Fee Voting
  • Define cadence (weekly or bi-weekly)
  • Define a cap for the maximum % of fees that can be adjusted each epoch, and which pairs would be eligible
  • Vote determines which pairs receive fee advantages for the following epoch

Execution format TBD by governance (both possible):

  1. discount = lower fee applied at execution
  2. rebate = refund a portion of the fee post-trade

VLR and other token amounts eventually involved:

No direct VLR/treasury expenditure required.
This uses protocol fee economics, not spending.


Does it require any technical development or additional resources?

Yes — parameter config + UI/UX

  • A more detailed study on fees distribution between all trading pairs (trading volume, etc)
  • need to enable dynamic fee parameters per pair
  • If the rebate model is chosen, integration with the payout pipeline (referral system) may be required

Are there any associated costs or budgets?

Potentially minor engineering scope + design for UI.
No upfront token spend.


Who should be involved in the implementation?

  • Velora core contributors (for technical validation)
  • Governance tooling owners (Snapshot space setup)
  • seVLR holders (voting)

Additional note

This post is meant to spark the conversation. I hope other contributors add their points here so we can check the real feasibility of the proposed solution.

2 Likes

Hi James, thank you for your proposal to the DAO. Prior to advancing with the discussion, we had a couple questions to ask regarding your proposal:

As an established delegate who has voted in the past for the rewards distributions, we are confused as to why you excluded seVLR’s staking utility and revenue incentives from the proposal. It is incorrect to say that seVLR Is used only for governance-related proposals.

Additionally, these mentioned fees are related to the UI frontend, which are not subject to DAO governance. The DAO is in control of the protocol and its treasury, and all proposals should fall within this scope.

Thanks for reminding this . Just to clarify, as I’m drafting something similar — is the DAO unable to propose adjustments to the fee structure and protocol revenue distribution?

Hello! Thanks for your input!

In hindsight, I acknowledge that the wording was not the best here. What I meant is that after creating a seVLR position to benefit os the staking rewards (“passive revenue share” = staking in this context), the owner does not have much to do with their tokens besides engage in governance activities that, in general, are not related to operational parameters from the protocol. Aave token holders vote on protocol parameters: Balancer, Curve, Aura token holders vote on protocol parameters.

The DAO was asked to come up with ideas to enhance VLR “value”, and my suggestion was to think a bit out of the box and try to introduce additional utility to the token, which brings us to your next point.

Thank you for pointing out a complete oversight on my part: I should have made it explicit that this relates to the percentage taken by the DAO.

2 Likes