Proposal: Gas Refunds distribution for Epoch 32
Vote: For
Rationale: We used the verification tool to recalculate the computed tree root hash using the published refunds file versus the expected root. We’re happy to vote for this gas refund distribution proposal.
Proposal: Rewards distribution for Epoch 33
Vote: For
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Proposal: Gas Refunds distribution for Epoch 33
Vote: For
Rationale: Our rationales for previous reward distribution and gas refund proposals largely apply for this set of rewards distribution & gas refund proposals. WakeUp Labs’ communication surrounding this initiative remains strong and we’ve cross-validated the data.
Proposal: PIP-68 - Upgrade VeloraDAO’s space to Snapshot Pro
Vote: For
Rationale: As we noted in the forum discussion, we’re in favor of supporting this proposal. Upgrading Velora’s Snapshot avoids the downsides of all-or-nothing delegation systems and it can lead to a healthier distribution of voting power. The cost of $6000 USD for an annual subscription is relatively small and worth the investment in our eyes.
Proposal: PIP-69 - Velora Treasury Management
Vote: For
Rationale: We voted in favor of this proposal. From a first principles perspective, we think this is the right time for Velora to bring in a professional manager to systematically optimize the protocol’s treasury. Avantgarde has a proven track record and, on a personal level, we’ve worked with the team in the past and can vouch for their professionalism. We’re happy to support moving forward as-is.
Proposal: PIP-70 - Velora Contributors Program (VCP) - Cycle 2 Renewal
Vote: For
Rationale: The DIP Cycle 1 had a lot of successes on many fronts, so we’re happy to vote in favor of its continuation. Some delegates noted the increased complexity in this iteration (now “VCP”), but it’s overall a similar system with a more granular way of assessing delegates’ impact. We don’t see any major reasons to oppose moving forward. We see this less as a devaluation of core governance, and more as a reward system for outstanding delegate performance. Passive/core governance activities can be weighted less heavily in our eyes.
Proposal: Gas Refunds distribution for Epoch 34
Vote: For
Proposal: Rewards distribution for Epoch 34
Vote: For
Rationale: No pending dissent for either of the WakeUp Labs proposals. Our rationales for previous reward distribution and gas refund proposals largely apply for this set of proposals.
Proposal: PIP-71: VeloraDAO Sponsorship of Governance Day 2025 – Buenos Aires
Vote: Sponsor Gov Day (Gold Tier)
Rationale: We’re voting to support sponsoring this event. We decided that the Gold tier would give the DAO the best ROI (getting a panel slot + booth + opening ceremony mention), without incurring any unnecessary spend for the Platinum tier. At this point in Velora’s development, we need to continue increasing awareness around the rebrand and the launch of VLR. Events like these, even if their scope is relatively smaller than some other crypto-related events, help show that Velora is committed to community engagement and growing brand awareness.
Proposal: PIP-72: Liquidity Funding for Futarchy Experimentation in Velora Governance
Vote: Approve $50,000 Liquidity for 6-Month Futarchy Pilot
Rationale: We’re voting to support this proposal as a low-risk, high-learning governance experiment. The pilot introduces futarchy-style conditional markets, allowing Velora to test market-based governance signals without altering any existing processes. The $50K liquidity (split evenly between VLR and sDAI) is temporary and carries minimal downside—primarily impermanent loss capped around ~$1.5K in stress scenarios.
Beyond experimentation, this initiative strengthens Velora’s position as an early adopter of advanced governance tools and opens the door to potential integrations with Futarchy.fi and Seer. It also promotes transparency, engagement, and education for delegates and the wider community. Overall, the pilot provides meaningful insight into how market dynamics can inform governance, with limited financial risk to the DAO.
Proposal: Rewards Distribution for Epoch 35
Vote: For
Rationale:
Our rationale for previous rewards distribution proposals applies here as well. This is a routine operational action to distribute staking rewards for seVLR holders across Ethereum, Optimism, and Base. WakeUp Labs continues to provide clear communication and transparent verification tools, and we’ve cross-checked the data for consistency. We support proceeding with the Epoch 35 distribution as proposed.
Proposal: PIP-73: VeloraDAO × Octav Partnership for Clear Treasury Reporting
Vote: For
Rationale: The partnership offers strong value relative to scope, improves financial clarity, and enables data-driven capital allocation without introducing significant operational complexity. While reliance on a third-party provider introduces minor risk, the cost-benefit and accountability improvements outweigh it. We support this proposal as a pragmatic, low-cost step toward higher transparency and better treasury management for Velora DAO.
Proposal: PIP-74: Discontinuing the Gas Refund Program
Vote: For
Rationale: Treasury health and complexity of DAO operations are important factors to consider, and winding down the gas refund program makes sense in that regard. Reducing the number of proposals per epoch and retaining more funds in the treasury is the right call at this point in the broader macro markets.
Note: we cast votes for these proposals but it appears they failed due to a Snapshot bug
Proposal: Gas Refunds distribution for Epoch 37
Vote: For
Proposal: Rewards distribution for Epoch 37
Vote: For
Rationale: No pending dissent for either of the WakeUp Labs proposals. Our rationales for previous reward distribution and gas refund proposals largely apply for this set of proposals. Note that we also supported the discontinuation of the gas refund program in PIP-74.
Proposal: PIP-75 - Fund request from a user claiming losses due to the March 2024 AugustusV6 vulnerability
Vote: Against
Rationale: While we have sympathy regarding the event that occurred, there was enough time to submit a request to address this. We understand that there was a knowledge gap in the affected user’s understanding at the time, but that’s an error that should not fall to the responsibility of the DAO. The protocol did everything in its power to notify affected users transparently and in a timely manner. We also agree that reimbursing the user this long after the incident sets a dangerous precedent for the DAO and opens it up to unneccesary liability.
Proposal: PIP-76: Governance Cost Rationalization and Operational Continuity
Vote: For
Rationale: As noted in the forums, we directionally support this effort to reduce operational burn and extend resources. The reduction of governance complexity (and the accompanying reduction in treasury burn rate) is a trend we’ve seen in other DAOs across the industry over the past six months. It’s important to adapt to market realities, and extending financial runway now makes sense, even if the resulting centralization is a bit more extreme than we’d prefer.
