PIP-75 - Fund request from a user claiming losses due to the March 2024 AugustusV6 vulnerability

It is good to see this topic brought to a formal vote, as it helps ensure process clarity and transparency. Thanks to Seed for pushing this forward.

As mentioned previously in the original discussion thread, my vote will also be No.

Crypto gives users a high degree of agency and autonomy, but that autonomy comes with an inherent increase in responsibility. Self-sovereignty means that users retain full control over their assets and permissions, and, as a result, the consequences of our actions carry greater weight. This includes understanding what approvals we grant, how long they remain active, and how to protect ourselves over time.

In this specific case, while the AugustusV6 vulnerability was real and clearly documented, the incident was handled in a timely and transparent manner by ParaSwap/Velora. The protocol was paused, the issue was fixed, affected users were proactively notified through multiple channels, and a formal compensation process (PEP-07) was established, approved by the DAO, and executed. That process had a defined scope, timeline, and budget, which has since been fully exhausted.

Reopening compensation well beyond the original window introduces meaningful governance and financial risks. It would effectively create an open-ended liability for the DAO and establish a precedent that similar claims could be brought indefinitely, even long after incidents have been disclosed, remediated, and communicated. This would weaken the finality of prior governance decisions and complicate future incident response.

While the user’s loss is unfortunate, and there is no suggestion of bad faith, the broader Web3 model requires users to maintain a baseline level of awareness of major protocol incidents and to actively manage residual approvals. This does not imply constant monitoring, but it does reflect a fundamental aspect of self-custody that differs materially from traditional financial systems.

For these reasons, and with the long-term governance implications in mind, I believe rejecting this request is the correct decision, even acknowledging the legitimacy of the underlying vulnerability and the user’s experience.