Thank you for continuing to engage with us and explaining your perspective in more detail.
I want to respond carefully, because this is clearly an emotional situation and I do not question the hardship and emotional rollercoster you going through.
That said, I think it’s important to clearly distinguish what the DAO is responsible for versus what cannot reasonably fall on the protocol or its governance, even in exceptional cases.
First, to clarify once again a few key points:
The AugustusV6 vulnerability was a protocol-level issue, true, and that is precisely why Velora paused the system, fixed the issue, communicated broadly, recovered funds (where possible) and most importanlty ran a DAO-approved compensation program with a scope and time window.
What happened later, in your case, was not an active protocol exploit but the use of an old approval that remained valid long after the incident had been mitigated and communicated.
At that point, the risk no longer originated from the protocol’s ongoing behavior but from residual permissions that are a known and permanent property of ERC-20 approvals across DeFi.
This distinction matters for governance.
On the argument that “ there is limited knowledge” should warrant somehow an exception, ill say that, DeFi, by design, operates under self-custody and users themselves have responsibility over actions and risk appetite.
This is not unique to us, it is the same reason why every major centralized exchanges, where funds originate most ofen, explicitly warns users that funds can be lost and that protections are limited. A lack of awareness about approvals, while understandable, cannot become a retroactive basis for compensation otherwise governance would have no objective boundary to operate within.
If the DAO were to adopt “the user didn’t know” as a criterion, it would effectively require the protocol to insure all past interactions indefinitely something no decentralized system can sustain without collapsing its treasury or governance legitimacy.
This is not about expecting users to audit code or predict exploits. It is simply about recognising few basic concepts like:
- approvals persist unless revoked,
- returning to an inactive wallet carries risk,
*** and that finality is essential once a remediation and compensation process has concluded.**
I also want to be very clear:
This vote is not a moral judgment on your intent, your honesty or your personal situation. Multiple delegates, myself included, have expressed genuine sympathy. But governance decisions must protect fairness for all users, including those who followed the original claim process and deadlines.
Approving this request now would not be a “human exception”, it would redefine the DAO’s liability model retroactively with consequences far beyond this single case.
For those reasons, and with respect and sympathy, my position remains unchanged.
I truly hope this experience serves as a painful but valuable lesson that helps prevent future losses not just for you, but for others reading this thread.
DeFi can be unforgiving, and this reality is exactly why strong boundaries in governance are necessary, even when they are difficult.