Curia - Delegate Communication Thread

Proposal: PIP-70 - Velora Contributors Program (VCP) - Cycle 2 Renewal**

Vote: For

Rationale: We’re supportive of VCP Cycle 2 and like the direction of distinguishing between traditional delegates and extraordinary contributors. The addition of Contributor Points feels like a natural evolution, since research, integrations, content, and analytics can create real impact for Velora and deserve recognition.

At the same time, we think it could help to keep some continuity with Cycle 1. The structure worked well, stayed under budget, and gave everyone clear expectations. Keeping the tier compensation levels steady, at least for this round, would let us keep that momentum. Contributor Points could then act as a bonus layer rather than a full redesign from day one.

A pilot phase for CP in the first half of the program might be a good way to test it out. We could run it as a bonus or multiplier, then do a mid-term review to see how it plays in practice before locking it in. That would give the DAO time to gather feedback and build shared confidence in the system.

Transparency will also be important. Publishing short monthly notes on why certain contributions earned their CP scores could help set benchmarks and avoid confusion. Over time, that would build precedent and give everyone a clearer sense of what “good” looks like.

Finally, while the 30-day vesting feels reasonable, it might be worth exploring a hybrid approach that keeps some rewards liquid and some locked. That way we balance long-term alignment with the fact that delegates also have real costs to cover.

Overall, we support the renewal of this program and the direction it’s headed. With a few small adjustments around continuity, inclusivity, and transparency, VCP Cycle 2 can push Velora governance to an even higher level.

Proposal: PIP-69 - Velora Treasury Management**

Vote: For

Rationale: We think setting up a dedicated Treasury Manager is the right step for Velora. Avantgarde is a strong candidate with the right background, and we truly appreciate the contributions they have already made to the DAO. Having someone focused on the treasury will bring structure, consistency, and professional oversight to an area that is becoming increasingly important.

At the same time, we believe the role should not be appointed directly. Even a short open application process could bring in other perspectives, help benchmark costs and strategies, and show the community that we are picking the best option available. Putting all responsibility into a single entity without competition creates concentration risk, similar to holding all assets in one protocol and being more exposed if something goes wrong. Diversifying not just assets but also the management process helps protect the DAO in the long run.

We also think compensation could be better aligned. A flat hourly rate provides stability, but adding a performance-based element tied to outcomes like sustainable yield, diversification, or risk management would create stronger alignment. If the treasury grows healthier and safer under their stewardship, both the DAO and the manager benefit.

Overall, we support this proposal and trust Avantgarde to do a great job. We simply recommend two improvements: open the process, even briefly, and add performance incentives. These changes would make the framework stronger, build community trust, and ensure the treasury is managed with both professionalism and resilience.

Proposal: Rewards distribution for Epoch 34

Vote: For

Rationale: After reviewing the proposal and the details, everything seems fine to us. Therefore, we have nothing further to add and will continue to support the proposal.

Proposal: Gas Refunds distribution for Epoch 34

Vote: For

Rationale: We voted in favor of this proposal, following the same rationale we used for the other rewards distribution. We have already agreed on it and will continue to support it.

Proposal: PIP-71: VeloraDAO Sponsorship of Governance Day 2025 – Buenos Aires**

Vote: Abstain

Rationale: As it’s our proposal, we voted abstain

Proposal: Rewards distribution for Epoch 35

Vote: For

Rationale: After reviewing the proposal and the details, everything seems fine to us. Therefore, we have nothing further to add and will continue to support the proposal.

Proposal: Gas Refunds distribution for Epoch 35

Vote: For

Rationale: We voted in favor of this proposal, following the same rationale we used for the other rewards distribution. We have already agreed on it and will continue to support it.

Proposal: PIP-72 - Liquidity Funding for Futarchy Experimentation in Velora Governance

Vote: For

Rationale:
Thanks for presenting this proposal. We had the chance to observe and partially participate in Optimism’s v1 futarchy experiment earlier this year, and wanted to share a few reflections that might be useful here:

  • Participation is critical. In OP’s case, there were over 400 forecasters, but that was after filtering out thousands of sybils in a play-money setup. Even then, volumes and engagement varied widely. For Velora, ensuring strong and genuine participation will likely be the make-or-break factor for whether signals are credible.

  • Signal quality and variance. At OP, futarchy did identify some top performers (e.g. Balancer & Beets) that the Grants Council had missed, but also picked one of the worst performers. This higher variance is both a strength (catching outliers) and a risk (greater noise). We should be mindful of how to interpret outcomes here, especially if sample sizes are small.

  • Prediction accuracy. Forecasters consistently overestimated impact in OP’s experiment, in part due to the play-money environment and anchoring effects. Having real skin-in-the-game (even if small) and clear metrics could help Velora avoid similar pitfalls.

  • Framing and communication. At OP, a lot of value came not just from the markets, but from how the results were framed in relation to existing governance structures. Making clear that futarchy here is non-binding and complementary will help set expectations and avoid perceptions of “gambling on governance.”

Overall, we support the spirit of experimentation. From what we saw at Optimism, futarchy can provide genuinely useful signals but it works best when paired with thoughtful design choices and clear communication around its role in governance.

Proposal: PIP-73: VeloraDAO x Octav Partnership for Clear Treasury Reporting**

Vote: For

Rationale:
We’ve carefully reviewed the discussion and believe this proposal provides a solid, cost-efficient solution to one of VeloraDAO’s recurring challenges, the lack of structured visibility and standardized reporting around its treasury. Engaging Octav at this stage makes sense both operationally and strategically, as it lays the foundation for more data-informed governance.

That said, we see an opportunity to frame this initiative not just as a reporting tool, but as the beginning of a governance infrastructure layer. Once Octav’s system is live, these reports could feed directly into performance and accountability mechanisms, such as quarterly treasury reviews, budget forecasting, or even future Treasury Manager evaluations. This would extend the value of the proposal far beyond its first year and align it closely with VeloraDAO’s long-term governance objectives.

A few small refinements could make the proposal even stronger:

  • Clarify renewal and pricing terms: confirm that the $8K annual rate will remain fixed for Year 2 or that renewal will require a DAO-level confirmation.

  • Data ownership: explicitly state that VeloraDAO retains full access and export rights to all reports post-contract, ensuring continuity and reducing lock-in risk.

Overall, this proposal is well-aligned with VeloraDAO’s governance maturity path, it introduces a measurable, scalable foundation for financial accountability. We support this initiative and see it as a meaningful step toward making VeloraDAO’s treasury management both transparent and decision-driven.**

Proposal: Rewards distribution for Epoch 36

Vote: For

Rationale: After reviewing the proposal and the details, everything seems fine to us. Therefore, we have nothing further to add and will continue to support the proposal.

Proposal: Gas Refunds distribution for Epoch 36

Vote: For

Rationale: We voted in favor of this proposal, following the same rationale we used for the other rewards distribution. We have already agreed on it and will continue to support it.

Proposal: PIP-74: Discontinuing the Gas Refund Program

Vote: For

Rationale: We support the proposal to discontinue the Gas Refund Program. The data clearly shows diminishing participation and limited financial relevance, with only around 12 percent of eligible wallets claiming during the last epoch. Still, this decision can be more than a cost reduction. It can be an opportunity to learn and improve how Velora designs and retires programs.

We believe the key question isn’t just what happened but why. Understanding whether low participation came from lack of awareness, low perceived value, or UX friction could help us create stronger incentive systems later. Gathering light feedback or analyzing claim transaction patterns could offer meaningful insights.

This could also be the start of a Program Sunset Framework where the DAO periodically reviews each initiative against measurable outcomes like user activity, ROI, or treasury impact. Embedding this process into governance makes cost reviews predictable and transparent rather than reactive.

Finally, while refunding gas once symbolized giving value back to users, we should communicate clearly how the freed funds will now support growth perhaps through staking rewards, integrations, or community incentives. That transparency helps maintain trust while keeping VeloraDAO efficient and adaptive.

Proposal: Rewards distribution for Epoch 37

Vote: For

Rationale: After reviewing the proposal and the details, everything seems fine to us. Therefore, we have nothing further to add and will continue to support the proposal.

Proposal: Gas Refunds distribution for Epoch 37

Vote: For

Rationale: We voted in favor of this proposal, following the same rationale we used for the other rewards distribution. We have already agreed on it and will continue to support it.