# Avantgarde Finance Delegate Platform **URL:** \ **Category:** Delegation\ **Created:** [December 4, 2024, 8:37am UTC](https://gov.velora.xyz/t/avantgarde-finance-delegate-platform/1997 "2024-12-04T08:37:55Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 8\ **Page:** 2
**Author:** ![Avantgarde](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/gov.velora.xyz/avantgarde/32/589_2.png) [@Avantgarde](https://gov.velora.xyz/u/Avantgarde)\ **Post date:** [September 29, 2025, 10:00am UTC](https://gov.velora.xyz/t/avantgarde-finance-delegate-platform/1997/21 "2025-09-29T10:00:54Z")
### [PIP-71: VeloraDAO Sponsorship of Governance Day 2025 – Buenos Aires](https://snapshot.box/#/s:paraswap-dao.eth/proposal/0xee485dff8a92388afa57ed81470693d8837c18fe0a14a18ec4eda5654248080d) We voted **abstain** rather than in support of the proposal mainly because the link and ROI between a governance-focused event and Velora is not super clear to us, while also acknowledging and partly agreeing with the [comments](https://gov.velora.xyz/t/pip-71-veloradao-sponsorship-of-governance-day-2025-buenos-aires/2220/21) made by the Laita team. At the same time, we recognise the manageable size of the investment as well as the seemingly widespread support for the proposal amongst other delegates, and so we don’t want our voting power to disproportionally affect the outcome of the vote. Either way, part of the Avantgarde team will be in Buenos Aires and likewise attend the Governance Day event, so the DAO can count on our support on the ground should the proposal pass. ---
**Author:** ![Avantgarde](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/gov.velora.xyz/avantgarde/32/589_2.png) [@Avantgarde](https://gov.velora.xyz/u/Avantgarde)\ **Post date:** [October 3, 2025, 4:29pm UTC](https://gov.velora.xyz/t/avantgarde-finance-delegate-platform/1997/22 "2025-10-03T16:29:23Z")
### **[PIP-72 - Liquidity Funding for Futarchy Experimentation in Velora Governance](https://snapshot.box/#/s:paraswap-dao.eth/proposal/0xe260a3ef6ac3e39f38c1b2366cfb488dcd0b4dfeaf7125612ddeb9fa7e753821)** We voted **abstain** for the Futarchy experiment, primarily because we don’t think it’s a priority. That said, it is definitely an interesting experiment and potential tool for the DAO at some future stage, we just think it remains unproven at this stage. Still, the commitment is minimal and there seems to be broad support in the DAO for it, and we don’t feel strongly enough about it to vote against the majority of delegates. See below for our full comment in the proposal thread: > [@PIP-72 - Liquidity Funding for Futarchy Experimentation in Velora Governance](https://gov.velora.xyz/t/pip-72-liquidity-funding-for-futarchy-experimentation-in-velora-governance/2226/20): > > Thanks for putting this proposal together. It’s good to see new tools being tested around governance and decision-making. That energy matters for Velora’s growth and token visibility, and we appreciate approach outlined here by @SEEDGov and collaborators. > > That said, we have a few questions and concerns: > > **Representation of smaller holders.** It’s not clear how futarchy improves representation for small token holders. If participation effectively depends on paying to play, it risks reinforcing whale influence rather than broadening it. > > **Price ≠ governance quality.** Several delegates already flagged that not every proposal maps cleanly to token price. Using price as the sole signal feels fragile as a governance input, even if it’s easy to measure. We’d like to see a path to incorporate additional metrics (revenue, volume, user activity) if this continues, echoing comments from @Sov and @PGov. > > **Limited track record.** Outside of a couple of experiments (e.g., Gnosis/Kleros), we don’t yet have robust evidence this improves decisions in practice. Even supporters in the thread frame this as _experimental_, which we agree with. > > **Participation scale and quality.** The target of 20–40 traders per market seems low for something that aims to inform governance. We agree with @Benibauer3 and @Sov that success criteria should be explicit upfront (participation, volume, signal divergence, and how signals influence delegate rationales). If this proceeds, it should be paired with education, co-marketing, and clear reporting so the community can actually learn from it. > > **On incentives (CP points).** We’re **not** supportive of the idea of distributing CP points for futarchy participation at this early pilot stage. If futarchy were to be implemented as an “official” governance mechanism at a later stage, this point should be discussed from the pov of the delegate program itself, not within this proposal. > > **On the “price is long-term” argument.** We appreciate @kas and @0xAlex laying out why price can, in theory, embed long-term expectations, and the examples from Kleros. Our worry is practical: thin participation plus narrative-driven flows can overwhelm fundamentals, especially in short windows. Price may be _a_ signal, but not the only one we should rely on. > > That said, the experiment is interesting and the pilot comes with limited risk, so if we see there is widespread support among delegates then we will not block the proposal but abstain. > > If the DAO proceeds and later considers extending beyond the initial 6 months, we may request a more detailed and adapted proposal. Including: > > 1. **Success criteria defined upfront** , in line with requests from @Sov and @Benibauer3 (min/target/stretch for unique traders and volumes, explicit thresholds for YES/NO divergence, and a requirement that at least one delegate rationale references the market outcome for it to “count” as useful). > 2. **Metrics beyond price** explored in future markets (e.g., revenue, fees, active users) as suggested by multiple delegates, so we’re not optimizing purely for “number go up.” > 3. **Participation quality guards** : sybil resistance for “unique traders,” disclosure on liquidity concentration/rebalances, and a ban on outcome-directional incentives. If any participation rewards are tested, they must be neutral, capped, and paired with sybil controls, per @jengajojo_daoplomats’ concern. > 4. **A transparent post-mortem template** each round (participation, depth, divergence, market resolution, any manipulation attempts, and how signals were used in delegate rationales), aligning with @PGov and others calling for institutional learning. ---
**Author:** ![Avantgarde](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/gov.velora.xyz/avantgarde/32/589_2.png) [@Avantgarde](https://gov.velora.xyz/u/Avantgarde)\ **Post date:** [October 11, 2025, 8:55am UTC](https://gov.velora.xyz/t/avantgarde-finance-delegate-platform/1997/23 "2025-10-11T08:55:37Z")
### [Gas Refunds distribution for Epoch 35](https://snapshot.box/#/s:paraswap-dao.eth/proposal/0xe1caa633a04c3439b003e044f4cbf95918154207dac9dc9f5561bd0282f7f15d) As per usual we voted in support of the recurring gas refunds. Thank you @WakeUpLabs for facilitating. ---
**Author:** ![Avantgarde](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/gov.velora.xyz/avantgarde/32/589_2.png) [@Avantgarde](https://gov.velora.xyz/u/Avantgarde)\ **Post date:** [October 22, 2025, 11:38am UTC](https://gov.velora.xyz/t/avantgarde-finance-delegate-platform/1997/24 "2025-10-22T11:38:36Z")
### **[PIP-73 : VeloraDAO x Octav Partnership for Clear Treasury Reporting](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/paraswap-dao.eth/proposal/0x98e5d150de28451f756a0bdf4ba00e05f468a1aa9e5b76e03e86c0a30ab39f63)** As the co-author of this proposal, we opted to abstain. ---
**Author:** ![Avantgarde](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/gov.velora.xyz/avantgarde/32/589_2.png) [@Avantgarde](https://gov.velora.xyz/u/Avantgarde)\ **Post date:** [November 4, 2025, 9:10pm UTC](https://gov.velora.xyz/t/avantgarde-finance-delegate-platform/1997/25 "2025-11-04T21:10:59Z")
### **[Rewards distribution for Epoch 36](https://snapshot.box/#/s:paraswap-dao.eth/proposal/0xfeae910fe0315f5cdb76d956a6ffa5ff0850a75b233f933d41a24e58f72fd2ce)** & **[Gas Refunds distribution for Epoch 36](https://snapshot.box/#/s:paraswap-dao.eth/proposal/0xeca8e40430abc3dac9b67e0f8122fbfe0de598a15977ba429c75bbc8ccd9975a)** Standard procedural vote in support of the rewards distribution and gas refunds. ---
**Author:** ![Avantgarde](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/gov.velora.xyz/avantgarde/32/589_2.png) [@Avantgarde](https://gov.velora.xyz/u/Avantgarde)\ **Post date:** [November 20, 2025, 1:49pm UTC](https://gov.velora.xyz/t/avantgarde-finance-delegate-platform/1997/26 "2025-11-20T13:49:15Z")
### **[PIP-74: Discontinuing the Gas Refund Program](https://snapshot.box/#/s:paraswap-dao.eth/proposal/0x616f8093efd3cb639c8531f704ebeba91ada8295277721f30dbfe9f386e4921b)** We expressed our support for this proposal early on in the forum thread (see below) as we don’t think the associated work to maintain the program can be justified given its low utilisation, which is simply because gas is no longer the issue it once was. Hence, we voted accordingly in favour of this proposal. > [@PIP-74: Discontinuing the Gas Refund Program](https://gov.velora.xyz/t/pip-74-discontinuing-the-gas-refund-program/2246/5): > > In full support of this proposal as it is indeed hard to justify the operational overhead for such a minor sum. Thanks for bringing this forward @WakeUpLabs, nothing to add really. We will vote in favour. ---
**Author:** ![Avantgarde](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/gov.velora.xyz/avantgarde/32/589_2.png) [@Avantgarde](https://gov.velora.xyz/u/Avantgarde)\ **Post date:** [December 1, 2025, 6:07pm UTC](https://gov.velora.xyz/t/avantgarde-finance-delegate-platform/1997/27 "2025-12-01T18:07:32Z")
### [Gas Refunds distribution for Epoch 37](https://snapshot.box/#/s:paraswap-dao.eth/proposal/0x33f61ec4719a8341ee12534f90e3a0f3acd02f8197f8adf15c14c53ab23ff8a6) **&** [Rewards distribution for Epoch 37](https://snapshot.box/#/s:paraswap-dao.eth/proposal/0xa58a6b32386d6660fb58b81b63dd457f334955df9519a711aab9f16569bce6a6) As per usual we voted in support of the gas refunds and rewards distribution as well as assisted in the transfers on the associated multisig. ---
**Author:** ![Avantgarde](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/gov.velora.xyz/avantgarde/32/589_2.png) [@Avantgarde](https://gov.velora.xyz/u/Avantgarde)\ **Post date:** [December 30, 2025, 1:47pm UTC](https://gov.velora.xyz/t/avantgarde-finance-delegate-platform/1997/28 "2025-12-30T13:47:06Z")
## **[PIP-75 - Fund request from a user claiming losses due to the March 2024 AugustusV6 vulnerability](https://snapshot.org/#/s:paraswap-dao.eth/proposal/0xf2c810181602b21adb789f5da0bb3befbe2ba006b828fd497ba258e1db666b9a)** We voted AGAINST. The DAO already ran a defined claims/compensation process at the time, which has since concluded. Reopening reimbursements long after the fact sets an unsustainable precedent and creates open-ended treasury liability. [Previous page](https://gov.velora.xyz/t/avantgarde-finance-delegate-platform/1997.md?page=1)